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asn1c
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6d67d91c
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6d67d91c
authored
Oct 05, 2004
by
Lev Walkin
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SEQUENCE and CHOICE fixes, plus security terms descriptions
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6d67d91c
0.9.7: 2004-Oct-0
3
0.9.7: 2004-Oct-0
4
* Finished CANONICAL-XER implementation by adding SET and SET OF
* Finished CANONICAL-XER implementation by adding SET and SET OF
canonical ordering support.
canonical ordering support.
...
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
...
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
* Removed C99'izm from the x509dump, now understood by older compilers.
* Removed C99'izm from the x509dump, now understood by older compilers.
* Enhanced UTF8String constraint validation, now it checks
* Enhanced UTF8String constraint validation, now it checks
for the minimal encoding length; API of UTF8String_length() changed.
for the minimal encoding length; API of UTF8String_length() changed.
* Fixed SEQUENCE dealing with premature termination of the
optionals-laden indefinite length structure. The code was previously
refusing to parse such structures.
* Fixed CHOICE code spin when indefinite length structures appear
in the extensions (Severity: medium, Security impact: medium).
Reported by <siden@ul-gsm.ru>.
0.9.6: 2004-Sep-29
0.9.6: 2004-Sep-29
...
@@ -289,3 +295,29 @@
...
@@ -289,3 +295,29 @@
0.1: 2003-Nov-28
0.1: 2003-Nov-28
* Programming started.
* Programming started.
=== Bug importance disclosure terms ===
SEVERITY.
This term applies to the frequence the particular construct is used
in the real world. The higher the frequency, the more chances of triggering
this bug.
low: The ASN.1 specifications which could trigger
this kind of bug are not widespread.
medium: The particular ASN.1 construct is used quite often,
so the chance of triggering an error is considerable.
high: This fix is considered urgent, or the particular ASN.1
construct triggering this bug is in wide use.
SECURITY IMPACT.
This term applies to the amount of potential damage a bug exploitation
could cause.
low: The local exploitation is unlikely; the remote exploitation
is impossible.
medium: The remote exploitation is possible when a particular ASN.1
construct is being used. If possible, only hard failure, spin
or memory leak are the possible outcome: no shellcode
injection could possibly be carried by the attack.
high: The remote shellcode injection is possible, or the bug is
otherwise remotely exploitable for most specifications.
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